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Income Inequality and Public Expenditures  
in Canadian Provinces: Is Director’s Law Still Relevant?*
KEN IMANAK SAGYNBEKOV 
 
University of Regina 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, I empirically test George Stigler’s (1970) theoretical 
argument, which is based on Aaron Director’s observation that income 
redistribution runs from the poor and the rich to the middle classes. Using 
a panel dataset for ten Canadian provinces from 1981 to 2008, I analyze 
the impact of various measures of inequality on provincial government 
size. The estimation results do not support the predictions of theories 
explaining the growth of government size on the basis of the median voter 
theorem.  
KEY WORDS  Income Redistribution; Gini Coefficient; Director’s Law 
In one of his seminal works, Stigler defines Director’s Law as follows: “Public 
expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the middle classes, and financed with 
taxes which are borne in considerable part by the poor and the rich” (1970:1). The 
theoretical justification that Stigler offers is based on the median voter theorem. 
According to this theorem, when the policy agenda is unidimensional and voters have 
single-peaked preferences, the legislative outcome will favor the median voter 
preferences. The assumption of single-peaked preferences is in most cases unrealistic, 
because it requires only one preferred choice among all alternatives. For example, when 
the viewers of a popular television show American Idol face the decision as to who 
should move to the next level of competition, they may have two or more equally 
preferred contestants in mind. When it comes to the choice of tax-financed expenditure 
alternatives, however, individuals will have a unique optimum as long as preferences are 
well behaved and exhibit diminishing marginal rate of substitution. In other words, there 
is only one tangency point between an individual’s indifference curve and her budget 
constraint. The key substantive assumption in Stigler’s argument is that there is a strong 
correspondence between the distribution of voters along the income scale and the 
distribution of income in the population. Given that these assumptions are met, a greater 
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income inequality therefore implies greater income redistribution in favor of the middle 
(income) classes.  
In this paper, I empirically test Director’s Law using the year-to-year change in 
government size as a dependent variable and various measures of income inequality as an 
independent variable. I employ a dataset that spans 1981 to 2008 and covers ten Canadian 
provinces. The results indicate that the sign on the coefficients for various measures of 
income inequality are positive, but the estimates are statistically not discernable from 
zero. Although the estimates clearly reject the implications of Director’s Law in its 
simplest form, once we account for Canadian voter profiles, the results become 
qualitatively more in line with the underlying logic of this law. 
The next section  in this paper presents a brief review of economic literature that 
addresses the relationship between growth of government and inequality. The third 
section presents the theoretical basis for econometric models in this paper. The fourth 
section presents a summary of the dataset used in the empirical analysis. The fifth section 
explains the choice of empirical strategies used in the analysis. The sixth section presents 
the results of empirical analysis. Finally, the seventh section concludes with a discussion 
of the difference between simple interpretation of Director’s Law and its underlying logic 
as explained by Stigler. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 1962, an extensive economic and political science literature has presented 
ample empirical evidence supporting theories based on individual rational choice in 
collective decision-making processes. One of the fruitful areas of public-choice research 
programs has been explaining variation of size and growth of government across 
countries and over time. Holcombe (2005) describes the public-choice explanation of 
government growth with three general theories: budget maximization, rational choice of 
collective decision making, and path dependency. The budget-maximization model 
(Friedman 1977; Niskanen 1971) offers an explanation as to why government size is 
large by assuming that the objective of bureaucrats is to maximize their budget size or 
revenue. The rational-choice models suggest that the size of government increases in 
response to the median voter preferences and demands of special-interest groups (Becker 
1983; Mueller 2002; Peltzman 1980; Shughart and Tollison 1986; Tollison 1991; Tullock 
1983). The path dependency, or “ratchet hypothesis,” explains government growth as an 
outcome of a series of external shocks that push government expenditures upward and 
subsequently keep expenditures above its level before the shock (Holcombe 1993). 
Another explanation that generated a large number of empirical studies is Wagner’s Law. 
According to this hypothesis, the demand for government services has income elasticity 
of demand greater than unity (Bird 1971).  
A growing literature in empirical analysis of government growth attempts to 
explain short-term variations in public expenditures. A commonly accepted explanation 
in this field underscores the effect of the partisan cycle, which suggests that succession of 
Sagynbekov  Income Inequality and Public Expenditures in Canadian Provinces  105 
 
power from one party to another leads to differential spending patterns, and the electoral 
cycle, according to which public expenditures rise before an election and fall afterward. 
Frey and Schneider (1978) argue that these cycles may be interrelated if the incumbent 
party’s future is uncertain. Recently, Tellier (2006) tested Frey and Schneider’s 
hypothesis that electoral cycles can interact with partisan cycles. Tellier’s analysis 
provides evidence to support Frey and Schneider’s hypothesis using a panel dataset for 
six provinces of Canada from 1983 to 1995. Petry et al. (1999) analyze a panel dataset for 
10 provinces that covers the period from 1974 to 1995 and report that the political party 
variable is statistically significant during nonelection years. Abizadeh and Gray (1992) 
report that the political party in power has no effect on levels or growth rates of public 
expenditures in provinces. They analyze a panel dataset covering 10 provinces in Canada 
from 1960 to 1986. The main result from their investigation is that tax base and 
unemployment were the primary factors in determining the growth of public 
expenditures. The author's attempt to find similar patterns of association with more recent 
data were not successful, which may indicate that the observed statistical significance in 
Abizadeh and Gray’s work may have been a result specific to their sample.  
Overall, recent contributions to this literature, particularly those using Canadian 
provincial data, focus on opportunistic behavior of politicians in power. This paper 
argues that studies of short-term variations in public expenditures also should account for 
the portion of population that exerts most influence upon the government. 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Stigler’s formal exposition of Director’s Law relies on two assumptions: (1) 
proportional taxation and (2) uniform subsidies per household. These assumptions are not 
necessary to arrive to the same conclusion, but they simplify mathematical exposition of 
the problem. In this simple framework, the subsidy to families belonging to income 
deciles with less than one-tenth of the national income would exceed its tax burden. If 
families in these deciles constituted the majority of voters, they would vote for 
redistribution. According to Stigler, “fiscal machinery of government” is flexible, and 
where the opportunity arises for the majority coalition of voters to gain at the expense of 
others, redistribution is likely to take place, be it the coalition of the middle classes with 
the rich or with the poor.  
Empirical analysis of Director’s Law is complicated by the absence of data on 
distribution of full tax burden and total benefits received by income classes. Furthermore, 
a researcher will face a colossal challenge of defining and defending what constitutes the 
middle classes. There is, however, one easily testable implication. If one assumes that 
income is the main “strategic basis for the formation of voting coalitions,” then more 
positively skewed income distribution is likely to increase income redistribution.  
Meltzer and Richard (1981) provide a theoretical model that overcomes part of 
the challenges seen in Stigler’s formalization of Director’s Law. The authors assume that 
the median income voter is the key decision maker. As the distribution of income gets 
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skewed more to the right, the distance between the median voter’s income and the 
average income increases, which induces the median voter to choose greater 
redistribution. Meltzer and Richard (1983) use a specific functional form to obtain a 
closed-form solution to their theoretical model, which results in the following linear 
model: 
 ln[t(1–F)] = α + β ln(m–1) + γ (1/yd) + u (1) 
The dependent variable consists of two parts: t is the measure of redistribution, and F is 
the dependency rate. The dependency ratio, F, is the proportion of the population eligible 
to receive subsidies for old age, disability, and dependent children. The product of (1–F), 
the proportion of population not eligible for direct subsidies, and t, the measure of 
redistribution, shows the degree of redistribution net of direct subsidies. The independent 
variables consist of natural log of m–1 and inverse of yd, where m is the ratio of the mean 
to the median income and yd is the median income. The theoretical model predicts that 
the higher the ratio of the mean to the median income greater is the net redistribution. 
Also, consistent with Wagner’s Law, a higher median income leads to greater net 
redistribution. One should therefore expect β > 0 and γ < 0.  
Even if the estimated parameter β in (1) turns out to have the wrong sign, we will 
not be able to definitively refute Director’s Law. If the median voter has above-average 
income, the majority voting coalition will be made up of the middle classes and the rich, 
and, subsequently, a simple redistribution from the rich to the middle classes may not be 
feasible. To make the hypothesis refutable, I modify (1) by adding voter turnout in 
provincial elections as an interaction term: 
 ln[t(1–F)] = α1 + β1 VoterTurnout ln(m–1) + γ1 (1/yd) + u (2) 
A measure of voter turnout puts greater weight on the inequality measure in a province-
year combination that had more active political participation. This may not adequately 
address the problem of locating the median voter in the income distribution, but it may 
increase the statistical precision of the estimated effect of m on measures of 
redistribution. 
DATA 
The primary data source for this analysis is Statistics Canada’s key 
socioeconomic database, CANSIM. The data consist of repeated cross-sections of 10 
provinces in Canada for the years 1981 through 2009.The 10 provinces are 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia. The data 
contain information on provincial public expenditures as a share of the provincial final 
domestic demand. This variable is constructed using the methodology proposed by 
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Imbeau et al. (2001). The primary dataset also contains province-specific Gini 
coefficients, ratios of the top quintile to the middle quintile (Q5/Q1) of the provincial 
income distribution, ratio of the middle quintile to the bottom quintile (Q3/Q1), ratios of 
the mean to the median income minus one, the dependency ratio measured as a share of 
the old (aged 65 or older) and the young (aged 15 or younger) in the population, per 
capita real federal transfers, and voter turnout in provincial elections. Table 1 reports the 
means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values of the variables used in 
the analysis. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Government Size 280 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.42 
Dependency Ratio 280 0.34 0.02 0.30 0.39 
(Mean/Median)–1 280 0.35 0.06 0.20 0.53 
Median Income 280 21581.07 3727.81 12800.00 34800.00 
Gini Coefficient 280 0.40 0.02 0.35 0.44 
Q5/Q3 280 2.38 0.16 2.05 2.78 
Q3/Q1 280 3.21 0.29 2.67 4.85 
Per Capita Real Federal 
Transfers 280 1925.30 990.46 486.82 7323.09 
Voter Turnout 280 70.29 9.85 40.60 87.00 
 
The average government size across the sample is 33 percent, with a standard 
deviation of 5 percent. There is a considerable variation in the government size, as 
evidenced by the standard deviation. Similarly, there is a substantial variation in most of 
the independent variables, which helps to reduce the standard errors for the estimated 
coefficients.  
The choice of the measure of income inequality has to account for the specifics of 
the investigation (Allison 1978). I use four measures of income inequality. Three 
measures are based on simple ratios of the top, middle, and bottom quintiles of the 
income distribution, and the Gini coefficient for before-tax income. The distribution of 
income in Canada changed substantially over time and across regions (Breau 2007). For 
the purposes of this study, it is important to capture how these changes affect the bottom, 
middle, and top income classes relative to each other. The fourth measure of income 
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inequality is the ratio of the mean to the median income in real 2009 dollars minus one. 
In this sample, the average value of this variable across all provinces is 0.35, with a 
standard deviation of 0.06. Clearly, this measure of inequality exhibits much lower 
variation than income quintile-based measures.  
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To determine the most appropriate empirical strategy, I carry out panel data-based 
tests for cross-section dependence, unit root, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. The 
formal test for cross-section dependence is based on Pesaran’s CD test. The results of CD 
test suggest that cross-section correlation is substantial and statistically significant for all 
variables. Commonly used tests for presence of panel unit root assume cross-section 
independence. More recently developed tests, however, allow for cross-section 
dependence. I employ the CADF test developed by Pesaran. This test indicates that most 
of the variables in my sample are integrated of order one. Further tests reject the null 
hypotheses that the panel dataset has no heteroscedasticity and has no autocorrelation of 
order one.  
One faces the risk of running a spurious regression by estimating equations (1) 
and (2) in levels, as the variables are nonstationary. The usual remedy is to estimate these 
equations using the first-differenced values. Although first-differencing reduces the total 
variation of the dependent variable, this approach produces additional benefits. For 
example, measures of income inequality vary across provinces and over time. These 
changes may be correlated with province-specific and time-invariant unobserved factors. 
First-differencing eliminates unobserved province-specific factors, which could 
potentially lead to biased estimates of all explanatory variables in empirical models. In 
other words, I sacrifice much of the variation in both the dependent and independent 
variables and in return obtain unbiased and more precise estimates of how income 
inequality affects provincial spending patterns.The diagnostic tests on the first-
differenced data indicate that series are stationary, but the cross-section dependence is 
still there. The cross-section dependence in the error term does not affect the estimates, 
but it makes the standard errors of estimates unreliable. I make several adjustments to the 
model specification to improve the reliability of standard errors. 
Based on the results of diagnostic tests, I estimate regression equations of the 
following common form: 
∆Gov.Size(1–Dependency Ratio)t = α + β1 ∆Inequalityt + β2 ∆Per Capita Real Incomet + εt  (3) 
∆ Gov.Size(1–Dependency Ratio)t = α + β1 ∆Inequality VoterTurnoutt-1  
 + β2 ∆Per Capita Real Incomet+ β3 ∆Additional Controlst + τt +εt (4) 
where t indexes years, τt is fixed effects for year, and εt is a disturbance term that is 
assumed to be heteroscedastic and autocorrelated. The panel data-specific test results 
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suggest that the data in this study exhibit both AR(1) serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. I follow the estimation strategy proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). In 
addition to addressing the contemporaneous correlation and autocorrelation of the panel 
error terms, I also control for year fixed effects to reduce the risk of omitting time-variant 
common effects that are potentially correlated with the right-hand-side variables. Of 
course, even after controlling for year fixed effects, it may be the case that the effects 
change over time and are correlated to each province uniquely.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equations in the previous section. The results 
of the regression analysis on the first-differenced values show a negative association 
between changes in the mean to the median income ratio and the adjusted government 
size. It implies that as the distance between the mean and median incomes increases over 
time, the change in government size decreases, which is completely the opposite of what 
Stigler’s and Meltzer and Richard’s models predict. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Gouveia and Masia (1998). The authors test empirically the predictions of 
Meltzer and Richard’s model using the panel data of the US states and report a negative 
association between government size and the mean-to-median ratio. In contrast to 
Gouveia and Masia, I consider other measures of income inequality. Namely, I substitute 
the mean-to-median ratio with the ratio of the fifth to the third quintiles, the third to the 
first quintiles, and Gini coefficient. If the median voter is not the median income-earning 
voter, then the model proposed by Meltzer and Richard will be severely misspecified and 
theoretical predictions cannot be tested using the mean to the median ratio.  
Stigler’s interpretation of Director’s Law suggests that it is not the distance 
between the mean and the median income but rather the distance between the middle 
classes from the rich and the poor that determines the degree of redistribution, as the 
middle classes are a key component for a successful coalition formation. Alternatively, 
we can rely on Stigler’s reasoning and assess the effect of relative income inequality on 
government size. To address the effect of voter turnout, I weigh income inequality 
measures by voter turnout shares in each province-year combination. The last three 
columns of Table 2 indicate that the relationship between income inequality and 
government size is positive for all three measures, after controlling for per capita real 
income and fixed time effects. The estimates, however, are not statistically significant. 
The outcome is not surprising, as the year-to-year variation in the ratios of income 
quintiles and Gini coefficient is not large in this particular sample.  
Contrary to the findings of Meltzer and Richard but consistent with those of 
Gouveia and Masia, I find no evidence in support of Wagner’s Law in this sample. The 
estimates of the coefficient on the inverse of per capita real median income are positive 
and statistically significant. The evidence from this sample points to a negative 
association between short-term variations in income and government size, after 
controlling for fixed time effects. 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent contributions to the economic literature that explains short-term variations 
in public spending focus primarily on the opportunistic behavior of politicians. In this 
article, I consider the other side of political decision making—the opportunistic behavior 
of voters to exploit the government. Stigler put it eloquently when he wrote, “If the 
coalition of voters is to make effective use of the political machinery of the state to 
redistribute income, it must find a state activity (expenditure) whose benefits flow to the 
coalition in greater proportion than the taxes which will finance the activity” (1970:4). 
According to Director’s Law, when there is correspondence between the 
distribution of voters along the income scale and the distribution of income in the 
population, the middle classes should reap the benefits of public expenditures 
disproportionately more than their contributions for public-goods financing. One 
implication of this law is that a greater income inequality should lead to greater 
redistribution of income measured in terms of the size of public expenditures. Using up-
to-date panel datasets for Canadian provinces for the period 1981 to 2008, I tested 
Stigler’s hypothesis indirectly by estimating the model proposed by Meltzer and Richard. 
My analysis finds no support for Meltzer and Richard’s model, in terms of either 
substance or statistical significance; however, when I use alternative measures of income 
inequality, the effect of income inequality on spending has the predicted sign but 
statistically is not discernible from zero, which indirectly indicates that the opportunistic 
behavior of voters may be less important than other forces such as the opportunistic 
behavior of politicians. 
An effective coalition, of which Stigler writes, may not necessarily lead to 
exploitation of the rich by the middle classes in broad agreement with the poor. The 
underlying argument for a positive relationship between measures of income inequality 
and the growth of public expenditures relies on the assumption that extending the 
franchise to the poor translates into active participation of the poor in the political process 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981). McCormick and Tollison (1981) suggest that it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for influential coalitions to have the poor. Tullock (1981, 1983) 
argues that the redistribution may be within the middle- or high-income classes and may 
have no impact on overall distribution of income. 
Recent data on Canadian and other advanced democracies clearly indicate a 
continuous decline in voter turnout (Gray and Caul 2000). Furthermore, this decline, or 
non-voting pattern, has been more pronounced for particular population subgroups of 
population. For example, Blais et al. (2004) report that in the Canadian context, income 
and education have been the most important socioeconomic determinants of voting, with 
substantially higher voter turnout among the rich and significantly higher nonvoting 
among the poor, uneducated, and voting-age youth. Also, these scholars find that the 
effect of income on voting is weaker in eastern provinces of Canada. Given these 
patterns, it is likely that the median voter, especially in provincial elections, is not 
necessarily the median-income voter. If the median voter is also an upper-middle income-
class voter, then her or his demand for public goods and services may be different from 
112  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 16, No. 2: Fall-Winter 2013 
the preferences of the poor. In that case, the effective coalition may consist solely of the 
middle-income voters and those on the lower end of the high-income classes. Income 
inequality between the middle classes and the poor may be an indicator of similarity in 
taste for public goods and services between the middle classes and the poor.  
One key element in this analysis is that the short-term variation of the public 
expenditures may not reflect the preferences of the upper-middle classes and the rich at 
the extensive margin, i.e. decisions to opt out from public goods markets to purchase 
similar services in private markets. It may have to do more with the actual relative 
demand for public goods and services. 
According to the provincial accounts from Statistics Canada, more than half of 
provincial expenditures are directed to health care and education. Dunlop, Coyte, and 
McIsaac (2000) report that Canadians with higher income use surgical day care, 
diagnostics, and other specialist services disproportionately more than those with lower 
income but that lower-income Canadians use acute inpatient care services more than 
those with higher income. The efforts to contain costs have been primarily successful in 
acute care services, but the costs associated with secondary ambulatory services, 
including expensive diagnostic procedures and dialysis, which higher-income Canadians 
use at a disproportionately higher rate, have been steadily increasing in rate and as a share 
of total hospital costs. 
Similarly, attendance at universities is affected by parental income. According to 
the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, about 41 percent of all university 
students are from high-income families, 28 percent are from middle-income families, and 
only 20 percent are from low-income families (Drolet 2005). Finnie and Mueller (2008), 
using nationally representative sample data, report that a parental income in excess of 
100,000 Canadian dollars increases the likelihood of attending university by 19.1 percent 
relative to the baseline income group of 50,000 to 75,000 Canadian dollars. They also 
find that having a parent with a bachelor’s degree increases the likelihood of attending by 
31 percent for male students.  
Returning to Stigler’s original argument, it may be the case that Canadian 
provincial politics is dominated by two distinct coalitions (two distinct profiles of the 
median voter) that use the state’s machinery to their advantage. The eastern provinces 
with smaller income inequality between the middle classes and the poor demand greater 
income redistribution, but the upper-middle-income and high-income Canadians in the 
western provinces exert sufficient political influence to keep public expenditures lower. 
Tullock (1981:906) suggests that all transfers are based on deception because plain truth 
would not get necessary political support. Perhaps in provinces where the rich have a 
considerable influence, the political cost of deception is substantially higher.  
The findings in this article must be interpreted with caution. Shughart and 
Tollison (1986) warn us that not all government growth is reflected in public 
expenditures. Without accounting for off-budget governmental activities, explanations of 
changes in government size measured with public expenditures will be, at best, 
incomplete.  
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
%∆Expenditures: Annual growth rate of total provincial public expenditures in 
percentage term. Total expenditures were measured in constant terms (2002 is the base 
year) before transformation. Source: CANSIM series v689291, v689314, v689337, 
v689360, v689383, v689406, v689429, v689452, v689475, v689498. 
%∆Personal Income: Annual growth rate of provincial personal income in percentage 
and in constant 2002 dollars. Following Tellier (2006), this variable was squared and 
multiplied by –1 when growth was negative. Terms were squared to give greater weight 
to higher values. Source: CANSIM series v691824, v691847, v691870, v691893, 
v691916, v691939, v691962, v691985, v692008, v692031. 
Budgetary Balance: Ratio of provincial public deficit as a percentage of total provincial 
expenditures. Similar to personal income variable, this variable was squared and 
multiplied by –1 during deficit and unaltered during surplus years. Source: CANSIM 
series v689282, v689305, v689328, v689351, v689374, v689397, v689420, v689443, 
v689466, v689489, v689291, v689314, v689337, v689360, v689383, v689406, v689429, 
v689452, v689475, v689498. 
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%∆Unemployment Rate: Annual growth rate of provincial unemployment rate in 
percentage term. Source: Statistics Canada Table 282-0002. 
%∆Federal Transfers: Annual growth rate of total federal transfers to provincial 
governments in real terms (2002 constant dollars). Source: CANSIM series v691289, 
v691312, v691335, v691358, v691381, v691404, v691427, v691450, v691473, v691496. 
Left, Right, and Election Years: Dummy variables indicating current government 
ideology. Left includes Parti Quebecois and NDP. Right includes Progressive 
Conservative, Social Credit, and SP. Election year is a dummy variable for provincial 
elections. Source: Canadian Parliamentary Guide.  
Age variables: Proportion of population aged 65 or older and 15 or younger is compiled 
using CANSIM series v466989, v467304, v467619, v467934, v468249, v468564, 
v468879, v469194, v469509, v469824, v467274, v467589, v467904, v468219, v468534, 
v468849, v469164, v469479, v469794, v470109. 
Quintile Variables: Five income quintiles were compiled using Statistics Canada Table 
202-0701. 
Gini coefficient: Gini coefficient of total income by province is compiled using Statistics 
Canada Table 202-0705. 
Income>100K: Proportion of provincial population with income in excess of 100,000 
Canadian dollars is compiled using Statistics Canada Table 202-0402. 
% University Degree: Proportion of provincial population with university degree is 
compiled using CANSIM series v2584827, v2587257, v2589687, v2592117, v2594547, 
v2596977, v2599407, v2601837, v2604267, v2606697. 
GDP Deflator: CANSIM TABLE 3840036 
